A general way of representing incomplete information is to use closed and convex sets of probability distributions, which are also called credal sets. Each credal set is associated with uncertainty, whose amount is quantified by an appropriate uncertainty measure. One of the requisite properties of uncertainty measures is the property of additivity, which is associated with the concept of independence. For credal sets, the concept of independence is not unique. This means that different definitions of independence lead to different definitions of additivity for uncertainty measures. In this paper, we compare the various definitions of independence, but our principal aim is to analyze those definitions that are employed in the most significant uncertainty measures established in the literature for credal sets.
Introduction
A research program whose objective is to study uncertainty and the associated uncertaintybased information (defined by uncertainty reduction) in all their manifestations was introduced in the early 1990s under the name "generalized information theory" (Klir 1991) . The primary motivation for introducing this research program came from some very fundamental methodological issues regarding the study of general systems. A recent book (Klir 2006 ) is a comprehensive and up-to-date coverage of results that have emerged from this research program.
The roots of generalized information theory are two classical uncertainty theories. They emerged in the first half of the 20th century and are both formalized in terms of classical set theory. The older one is based on the notion of possibility. The newer one, which has been considerably more visible, is based on the notion of probability. Both theories are conceptualized in terms of a considered set of mutually exclusive alternatives (predictions, retrodictions, diagnoses, etc.) , which is usually referred to as the universal set. It is assumed that only one of the alternatives is true, but information based on all available evidence regarding the true alternative is not sufficient to determine which one it is. This information deficiency results in uncertainty regarding the true alternative. Depending on the application, the universal set is either finite or infinite. In this paper, we consider only finite universal sets.
In possibility-based uncertainty theory, information is gained (and uncertainty reduced) by obtaining evidence that some of the considered alternatives in the universal set are not possible. Uncertainty is thus expressed by a subset of those alternatives in the universal set that, under all available evidence, remain possible. This kind of uncertainty results clearly from the lack of specificity (or precision). Large sets of possible alternatives result, for example, in less specific (or less precise) predictions (or diagnoses, retrodictions, etc.) than their smaller counterparts. Full specificity (or precision) is obtained when only one of the considered alternatives remains possible. This type of uncertainty is thus well characterized by the term non-specificity (or imprecision).
In probability-based uncertainty theory, uncertainty regarding the true alternative is expressed, on the basis of all available evidence, by assigning to each alternative in the universal set a relative degree of confidence, referred to as a probability, that the alternative is the true one. That is, the full degree of confidence, expressed by the number 1, is distributed among the alternatives according to their relative support by given evidence. It is thus claimed, in general, that several alternatives are the true ones with various degrees of confidence that are required to add to 1. Since only one alternative is true, it is clear that these claims conflict with one another. This type of uncertainty is thus well characterized by the term conflict.
The possibility-based uncertainty theory has sometimes been portrayed as a theory subsumed under the one based on probability. This view is ill conceived, as was clearly recognized, for example, by Kolmogorov (1965) and Rényi (1970) . Indeed, the possibilitybased theory is not only logically independent of any probabilistic assumptions, but it is also not distributive, in contrast with the one based on probability. Moreover, possibility theory is superior to probability theory in some application areas. For example, it has been argued extensively by Shackle (1961) that possibility theory and not probability theory is appropriate to capture the nature of choice in economics; see also Klir (2002) for more details.
The assumption that the two classical theories of uncertainty are sufficient to capture uncertainty was challenged in the second half of the 20th century by the emergence of two important generalizations in mathematics. One of them is the generalization of classical measure theory to a broader theory of monotone measures by replacing the requirement of additivity with a weaker requirement of monotonicity with respect to set inclusion, which was first proposed by Choquet (1953 -54) . The second generalization is the extension of classical set theory to fuzzy set theory by abandoning the classical requirement that sets have sharp boundaries, which was introduced by Zadeh (1965) . Many prospective new uncertainty theories were suggested by these two generalizations. Each of these new theories is conceptualized in terms of a monotone measure of some special type, which is defined in terms of classical sets or fuzzy sets of some type.
In order to develop a fully operational theory, T, for dealing with uncertainty of some conceived type, we need to address relevant issues at the following four levels:
. LEVEL 1-we need to find an appropriate mathematical representation of the conceived type of uncertainty, which is achieved by characterizing, via appropriate axioms, a class of uncertainty functions, say functions u, that represent uncertainty in theory T. Examples of uncertainty functions are probability measures in classical, probability-based uncertainty theory (Halmos 1950) . . LEVEL 2-we need to develop operating rules (calculus) for manipulating uncertainty functions u in theory T. An example is the calculus of probability theory. . LEVEL 3-we need to find a meaningful way of measuring the amount of relevant uncertainty in any situation formalizable in theory T, which is achieved by finding a justifiable functional, U, that for each uncertainty function u in theory T measures (in some chosen measurement units) the amount of uncertainty captured by this function. Functional U is usually called an uncertainty measure. An example of functional U is the well-known Shannon entropy in classical, probability-based uncertainty theory (Shannon 1948) . . LEVEL 4-we need to develop methodological aspects of theory T by utilizing functional U as an abstract measuring instrument of the theory. An example is the use of the Shannon entropy in the principles of maximum and minimum entropy (Christensen 1980 -81) .
In each given uncertainty theory, a considered functional U must satisfy several intuitively essential axiomatic requirements to be acceptable as an uncertainty measure in the theory. Specific mathematical formulation of each of these requirements depends on the uncertainty theory involved. However, the requirements can be described informally, independent of the various uncertainty calculi, in the following generic form:
1. Subadditivity-the amount of uncertainty embedded in a joint uncertainty function (defined on a Cartesian product) must be smaller than or equal to the sum of the amounts of uncertainty embedded in the associated marginal uncertainty functions. 2. Additivity-given two universal sets and marginal uncertainty functions defined on them that are independent, the sum of the amounts of uncertainty embedded in these functions must be equal to the amount of uncertainty embedded in the associated joint uncertainty function (defined on the Cartesian product of the two universal sets). 3. Continuity-an uncertainty measure must be a continuous functional. 4. Range-the range of the amounts of uncertainty embedded in uncertainty functions of a given uncertainty theory must be a closed interval [0,r ] of real numbers, where 0 corresponds to full certainty and the value r depends on the chosen measurement unit and the size of the universal set involved. 5. Expansibility-expanding the universal set by alternatives that are not supported by given evidence must not affect the amount of uncertainty. 6. Branching/Consistency-when the amount of uncertainty embedded in uncertainty functions of a given uncertainty theory can be computed in several distinct ways, all of which conform to the calculus of the theory, the results must be the same (consistent). 7. Monotonicity-when uncertainty functions in a given uncertainty theory can be ordered in the same way as we can intuitively order the amount of evidence, the uncertainty measure must preserve this ordering. 8. Measurement unit-a suitable measurement unit is defined by specifying what the amount of uncertainty should be for a particular (and usually very simple) uncertainty function.
When distinct types of uncertainty coexist in a given uncertainty theory, as is common in the various non-classical uncertainty theories, it is not necessary that these requirements be satisfied by each uncertainty type. However, they must be satisfied by a measure that appropriately aggregates measures of the individual uncertainty types.
The strongest justification of a functional as a meaningful uncertainty measure of a considered type of uncertainty in a given uncertainty theory is obtained when we can prove that it is the only functional that satisfies all the relevant axiomatic requirements formulated in the calculus of the theory.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the additivity requirement, under different conceptions of independence (De Campos and Moral 1995) , for uncertainty measures in the theory based on arbitrary closed and convex sets of probability distributions (Kyburg 1987) , which are also referred to as credal sets (Levi 1980) . The theory based on credal sets is currently the most general theory dealing with imprecise probabilities (Walley 1991) . Also examined in this paper is the additivity requirement for uncertainty measures in four less general, but important theories of imprecise probabilities: a theory based on the Choquet capacities of order 2 (Choquet 1953 -54) , a theory based on reachable probability intervals (De Campos et al. 1994 , Tanaka et al. 2004 , the well-known Dempster -Shafer theory (DST) of evidence (Dempster 1967 , Shafer 1976 , which is based on Choquet capacities of order 1 (Choquet 1953 -54) , and the theory of graded possibilities (De Cooman 1997) . All these theories are formalized in terms of classical set theory. Their ordering in terms of generality is shown in figure 1 . The additivity requirement for uncertainty measures is investigated in this paper because the concept of independence is not unique when the classical theories of uncertainty are generalized. Our aim is not to consider all suggested types of independence, but to focus only on those that have been employed for defining additivity of principal uncertainty measures discussed in the literature.
The paper is structured as follows. Uncertainty theories that are of concern in this paper are briefly introduced in Section 2. An overview of measures of uncertainty in these theories is the subject of Section 3. Different concepts of independence for credal sets are examined in Section 4, and their role in verifying additivity of the uncertainty measures introduced in Section 3 is examined in Section 5. Section 6, is devoted to conclusions and a discussion of future work regarding the additivity requirement for uncertainty measures.
Theories of imprecise probabilities

Credal sets
All theories of imprecise probabilities that are based on classical set theory share some common characteristics. One of them is that evidence within each theory is fully described by a lower probability function P * or, alternatively, by an upper probability function P*. These functions are always regular monotone measures (Wang and Klir 1992) that are superadditive and subadditive, respectively, and X
In the various special theories of uncertainty, they possess additional special properties. When evidence is expressed (at the most general level) in terms of an arbitrary credal set (a closed and convex set C of probability distribution functions p) on a finite set X (Kyburg 1987) , functions P * and P* associated with C are determined for each A # X by the formulas:
Since X for each p [ C and each A # X, it follows that:
Due to this property, functions P * and P* are called dual (or conjugate). One of them is sufficient for capturing given evidence; the other one is uniquely determined by equation (3). It is common to use the lower probability function to capture the evidence.
As is well known (Chateauneuf and Jaffray 1989, Grabisch 2000) , any given lower probability function P * is uniquely represented by a set-valued function m for which 
The inverse transform is defined for all A # X by the formula:
It follows directly from equation (3) that:
for all A # X. Assume now that evidence is expressed in terms of a given lower probability function P * : Then, the set of probability distribution functions that are consistent with P * ; CðP * Þ; which is always closed and convex, is defined as follows:
Choquet capacities of various orders
A well defined category of theories of imprecise probabilities is based on Choquet capacities of various orders (Choquet 1953 -54) . The most general theory in this category is the theory based on capacities of order 2. Here, the lower and upper probabilities, P * and P*, are monotone measures for which P * ðA < BÞ $ P * ðAÞ þ P * ðBÞ 2 P * ðA > BÞ; ð9Þ P* ðA > BÞ # P* ðAÞ þ P* ðBÞ 2 P* ðA < BÞ; ð10Þ
for all A, B # X. Less general uncertainty theories are then based on capacities of order k. For each k . 2, the lower and upper probabilities, P * and P*, satisfy the inequalities:
for all families of k subsets of X, where N k ¼ {1, 2, . . ., k}. Clearly, if k 0 . k, then the theory based on capacities of order k 0 is less general than the one based on capacities of order k. The least general of all these theories is the one in which the inequalities are required to hold for all k $ 2 (the underlying capacity is said to be of order 1). This theory, which was extensively developed by Shafer (1976) , is usually referred to as evidence theory or DST. In this theory, lower and upper probabilities are called belief and plausibility measures. An important feature of DST is that the Möbius representation of evidence m (usually called a basic probability assignment function in this theory) is a non-negative function
. DST is thus closely connected with the theory of random sets (Molchanov 2004 ). When we work with nested families of focal elements, we obtain a theory of graded possibilities, which is a generalization of classical possibility theory (De Cooman 1997 , Klir 2006 ).
Probability intervals
In this theory, lower and upper probabilities P * and P* are determined for all 1] , and inequalities (1) must be satisfied. Each given set of probability intervals
associated with a closed convex set, C(I), of probability distribution functions, p, defined as follows:
Sets defined in this way are clearly special cases of sets defined by equation (8). Their special feature is that they always form a (n 2 1)-dimensional polyhedron, where n ¼ jXj. In general, the polyhedron may have c vertices (corners), where n # c # nðn 2 1Þ;
and each probability distribution function contained in the set can be expressed as a linear combination of these vertices (Weichselberger and Pöhlmann 1990, De Campos et al. 1994) .
A given set I of probability intervals may be such that some combinations of values taken from the intervals do not correspond to any probability distribution function. This indicates that the intervals are unnecessarily broad. To avoid this deficiency, the concept of reachability was introduced in the theory (De Campos et al. 1994) .
A given set I is called reachable (or feasible) if and only if for each x [ X and every value v(x) [ [l(x) , u(x)] there exists a probability distribution function p for which p(x) ¼ v(x). The reachability of any given set I can be easily checked: the set is reachable if and only if it passes the following tests: X If I is not reachable, it can be easily converted to the set
reachable intervals by the formulas:
for all x [ X. Given a reachable set I of probability intervals, the lower and upper probabilities are determined for each A # X by the formulas:
It was shown by Sgaro (1997) that the theory based on reachable probability intervals and DST are not comparable in terms of their generalities. However, they both are subsumed under a theory based on Choquet capacities of order 2 (see figure 1).
Choquet capacities of order 2
Although, Choquet capacities of order 2 do not capture all credal sets, they subsume all the other special uncertainty theories that are examined in this paper (figure 1). They are thus quite general. Their significance is that they are computationally easier to handle than arbitrary credal sets. In particular, it is easier to compute CðP * Þ defined by equation (8) when P * is a Choquet capacity of order 2.
Let X ¼ {x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x n } and let s ¼ (s(x 1 ), s(x 2 ),. . .,s(x n )) denote a permutation by which elements of X are reordered. Then, it is established Bolaños 1989, Miranda et al. 2003 ) that for any given Choquet capacity of order 2, CðP * Þ is determined by its extreme points, which are probability distributions p s computed as follows: 
Each permutation defines an extreme point of CðP * Þ; but different permutations can give rise to the same point. The set of distinct probability distributions p s is often called an interaction representation of P * (Grabisch 2000).
Uncertainty measures: an overview
It is well established that uncertainty in classical possibility theory is quantified by the Hartley measure (Hartley 1928) . For each nonempty and finite set A # X of possible alternatives, the Hartley measure A, H(A), is defined by the formula:
where jAj denotes the cardinality of A. Since H(A) ¼ 1 when jAj ¼ 2, H defined by equation (19) measures uncertainty in bits.
The uniqueness of H was proven on axiomatic grounds by Rényi (1970) . The type of uncertainty measured by H is usually called non-specificity.
In classical probability theory, a justifiable measure of uncertainty was derived by Shannon (1948) . This measure, which is usually referred to as Shannon entropy and denoted by S, is defined for each given probability distribution function p on a finite set X by the formula: (20) measures uncertainty in bits. However, the type of uncertainty measured by the Shannon entropy is different from the uncertainty type quantified by the Hartley measure; it is well captured by the term conflict. When the classical uncertainty theories are generalized, both types of uncertainty coexist. This required that the Hartley measure and Shannon entropy be properly generalized in the various theories.
The Hartley measure was first generalized for graded possibilities by Higashi and Klir (1983) and later to DST by Dubois and Prade (1985) . Its generalized form, GH, is defined in terms of the Möbius representation, m, by the formula:
The uniqueness of this generalized Hartley measure GH was proven for graded possibilities by Klir and Mariano (1987) and for DST by Ramer (1987) . Efforts to generalize the Shannon entropy to DST were less successful. Although several intuitively promising candidates for the generalized Shannon measure, GS, were proposed in the literature in the 1980s and early 1990s, each of them was found to violate the essential property of subadditivity. This would have been acceptable if subadditivity were satisfied for the sum GH þ GS. Unfortunately, this was not the case for any of the proposed measures. A digest of these frustrating efforts is given in Klir and Wierman (1999) and also in Klir (2006) .
In the early 1990s, the unsuccessful attempts to find a generalized Shannon entropy in DST were replaced with attempts to find an aggregated measure of both types of uncertainty (Harmanec and Klir 1994 ). An aggregate measure that satisfies all the required properties (additivity, subadditivity, monotonicity, proper range, etc.) was eventually found around the mid 1990s by several authors (see Klir (2006) for more details). This aggregate uncertainty measure is a functional S* that for each belief function Bel in DST is defined as follows:
where the maximum is taken over the set P Bel of all probability distribution functions p that dominate the given function Bel (i.e. Bel(A) # P x[A pðxÞ for all A # X). This functional can be readily generalized to any given convex set of probability distributions, as was shown by Abellán and Moral (2003) . Useful algorithms for computing S* were developed for DST by Harmanec et al. (1996) , for reachable interval-valued probability distributions by Abellán and Moral (2003) , and for the theory based on Choquet capacities of order 2 (2-monotone measures) by Abbellán and Moral (2005b) .
Although the functional S* is acceptable on mathematical grounds as an aggregate measure of uncertainty in any uncertainty theory where evidence can be represented in terms of arbitrary convex sets of probability distributions, it is highly insensitive to changes in evidence due to its aggregated nature (Klir and Smith 2001) and, moreover, it does not show explicitly measures of the two coexisting types of uncertainty-non-specificity and conflict. It is thus desirable to disaggregate it. Clearly, S* ¼ GH þ GS, where GH and GS denote, respectively, a generalized Hartley measure (measuring non-specificity) and a generalized Shannon entropy (measuring conflict). Since S* and GH (defined by equations (22) and (21), respectively) are well established, at least in DST, it is suggestive to define GS indirectly as the difference S* 2 GH, providing that it is nonnegative. It was proven by Smith (2000) that S* 2 GH $ 0 and, hence, it is meaningful to take GS ¼ S* 2 GH as the generalized Shannon entropy. Then, the disaggregated total uncertainty measure, TU, is defined as the pair
where GH is defined by equation (21), S* is defined by equation (22), and GS ¼ S* 2 GH. Now, it is guaranteed that GH þ GS satisfies all the required mathematical properties (since GH þ GS ¼ S*) and it does not matter whether each of the two components of TU satisfies them as well. This is important since subadditivity of GH is not guaranteed beyond DST, as is demonstrated by the following example.
of all convex combinations of joint probability distributions Clearly, GH X ¼ GH Y ¼ 0 in this example. However, calculating the lower probabilities from P and their Möbius transform, we obtain GH ¼ 0.332. Hence, subadditivity of the generalized Hartley measure is violated in this example. While the credal set in this example is of a very general type, which cannot be represented by a Choquet capacity of order 2, we do not know if GH is subadditive beyond DST. As recognized by Abellán and Moral (2005a,c) , their proof in Abellán and Moral (2000) regarding subadditivity turns out to be invalid. However, once again, the lack of subadditivity of GH is of no consequence in terms of the disaggregated total uncertainty (23).
The idea of disaggregating S* into two components, measures of non-specificity and conflict, opened new possibilities. One of them is based on the recognition that the following two functionals can be defined for each credal set C:
The significance of these functionals and their difference, S* 2 S * ; for capturing uncertainty associated with convex sets of probability distributions was first discussed by Kapur (1994) and Kapur et al. (1995) . It was also suggested by Smith (2000) and Klir and Smith (2001) . More recently, Moral (2004, 2005a) further investigated properties of the difference S* 2 S * and described an algorithm for calculating the value of S * ; which is applicable to any convex set of probability distributions whose lower probability function is a Choquet capacity of order 2. They suggested that it is reasonable to view this difference as an alternative measure of non-specificity. That is, they suggested defining a measure of nonspecificity, N, for each credal set C of probability distributions by the formula:
They also showed that functional N possesses the following properties:
, where X denotes the set of all alternatives (elementary events) on which the probability distributions in C are defined: N(C) ¼ 0 when C consists of a single probability distribution; N(C) ¼ log 2 jXj when C consists of all probability distributions that can be defined on X (total ignorance expressed by vacuous probabilities). 2. N is monotone increasing with respect to the subsethood relation between the sets of probability distributions defined on the same set X: for all i C and
These properties, which every measure of non-specificity must possess, motivated the suggestion that this functional may be viewed as a measure of non-specificity. Unfortunately, contrary to the generalized Hartley functional, functional N violates the essential requirement of subadditivity in virtually any uncertainty theory, including DST. This means that N is not acceptable alone as a measure of non-specificity. However, when considered as one component of a disaggregated total uncertainty measure, then the lack of subadditivity of the individual components is of no consequence. It only matters that the aggregated uncertainty S* satisfies all the essential requirements, including subadditivity. This suggests defining an alternative disaggregated total uncertainty, a TU, as the pair a TUðCÞ ¼ kS* ðCÞ 2 S * ðCÞ; S * ðCÞl: ð27Þ
Observe that the first component of a TU is the alternative non-specificity measure N, while the second component, S * ; is a generalized Shannon measure (a general measure of conflict). When the two components are aggregated, we obtain S* and, clearly, this functional satisfies all the essential mathematical requirements. Hence, even though neither of the components of a TU is subadditive, this does not matter since the aggregated uncertainty S* is subadditive.
It is interesting to observe that the functional S * has often been considered as one of the candidates for the generalized Shannon entropy. It was dismissed since it is not subadditive, and neither it is subadditive when aggregated with the generalized Hartley measure GH. However, it is perfectly justifiable when aggregated with the alternative measure of nonspecificity N. In fact, some of the other candidates considered for the generalized Shannon entropy could now be considered on similar grounds, although the functional S * seems to be better justified than its competitors not only by its properties, but also by its behavior and its applicability to all credal sets. Nevertheless, viewing the measure of non-specificity, in general, as the difference of the aggregate uncertainty S* and the generalized Shannon entropy GS, opens a new area of research, whose purpose is to compare the various candidates for GS with the functional S * :
Independence on credal sets
The concept of independence plays an important role in all uncertainty theories. Under independence, complex systems formalized within a given uncertainty theory can be represented, without any loss of information, by appropriate simpler systems or, conversely, complex system can be constructed from simpler systems.
The meaning of independence in classical possibility theory and classical probability theory are fundamentally different, but in either theory the meaning is unique. In possibility theory, independence means that each joint possibility is equal to the minimum of the associated marginal possibilities; in probability theory, it means that each joint probability is equal to the product of the associated marginal probabilities.
It is well known that the classical concept of possibilistic independence is applicable to the theory of graded possibilities as well (Klir 2006) . Moreover, the concepts of both possibilistic and probabilistic independence are employed in the following standard definition of independence in DST, referred to as random set independence (Couso et al. 1999) .
Given finite sets X and Y, let m denote a joint probability assignment function on X £ Y, and let m X and m Y denote the associated marginal functions on X and Y, respectively. Then, 
This concept of independence in DST is largely accepted in the literature. However, when generalizing from DST to arbitrary credal sets, the concept of independence is not any more unique, as is exemplified by Couso et al. (1999) . Each definition of independence is appropriate under some assumptions. We want only to examine those definitions that have been used in formulating the additivity requirement of the various uncertainty measures on credal sets and to prove that these uncertainty measures satisfy the requirement.
In Couso et al. (1999) , six definitions of independence are presented for credal sets, and it is argued that each of them is useful for some applications. However, the following concept of strong independence is considered useful in most applications.
Definition 1 Strong Independence. Let C be a credal set on X £ Y, where X and Y are finite sets, and let C X and C Y denote the associated marginal credal sets. We say that there is strong independence under
, where CH denote the convex hull of
The concept of strong independence has been used for defining the additivity requirement of uncertainty measures S* and S* 2 S * ( Moral 2003, 2005a) . The concept can be easily applied in DST as well, but it produces a joint credal set that is different, in general, from the one produced by equation (28). This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Let C X and C Y be the following credal sets on X ¼ {x 1 , x 2 } and Y ¼ {y 1 , y 2 }, respectively: For convenience, let p ij ¼ p(x i , y j ) and let p ¼ (p 11 , p 12 , p 21 , p 22 ) denote a joint probability distribution on X £ Y. When the concept of strong independence is applied to C X and C Y , we obtain the joint credal set When the concept of independence defined by equation (28) is applied, where m X and m Y are in this example basic probability assignment functions associated with C X and C Y , respectively, we obtain the joint credal set. The concept of random set independence, which is by and large accepted in DST can be generalized in the following way to arbitrary credal sets.
Definition 2 Mass independence. Let C, C X and C Y have the same meaning as in Definition 1, and let m, m X and m Y denote, respectively, the associated mass assignment functions (Möbius representations). We say that there is a mass independence under C if for all A # X and all B # Y,
Observe that equations (28) and (29) have the same form, but the meaning of functions m, m X and m Y in equation (29) is more general: they are not required to be nonnegative as in equation (28).
The concept of mass independence has been used for formulating the requirement of additivity for the generalized Hartley measure (Abellán and Moral 2000) .
For certain types of credal sets, the definitions of strong independence and mass independence can produce the same joint credal sets, as is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3. Consider two urns, Urn 1 and Urn 2, with the following incomplete information regarding their contents:
. Urn 1: It contains balls whose colors are Red (R), White (W) and Black (B). It is known that the proportion of the sum of two of them is greater than the third one. . Urn 2: It contains balls labeled with numbers 1 and 2. It is known that four are labeled with 1, four are labeled with 2, and we do not know what the labels of remaining two balls are; we only know that they must be 1 or 2.
This incomplete information regarding the contents of the urns can be fully represented by different theories of imprecise probabilities as follows:
Urn 1: We can use reachable probability intervals to represent the information. Let V 1 ¼ {R, W, B} denote the set of alternatives and let p ¼ ðpðRÞ; pðWÞ; pðBÞÞ denote probability distributions on V 1 . Then, the set of all probability distributions compatible with the information is expressed as: The associated credal set is C m 2 ¼ CHð{ð0:4; 0:6Þ; ð0:6; 0:4Þ}Þ; where probability distributions p on V 2 are expressed as p ¼ (p({1}), p({2})). For the joint experiment of obtaining a ball from each urn the set of alternatives is Converting now m to lower probabilities and using equations (18) to determine vertices of the associated credal set, we obtain via strong independence: We know from Example 2 that the strong independence neither imply the mass independence nor is implied by it. However, observing Example 3 suggests that these two concepts of independence are related in some way. We are going to prove that under some concrete conditions they produce the same joint credal set. First, we need to prove a useful Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let C be a credal set on a finite set X and let f be the capacity associated with C via the equation f(A) ¼ inf p [C p(A) , ;A # X. Then, it is verified that such lower value is attained for an extreme probability of C, i.e. ;A # X, f(A) ¼ p A (A), with p A being some vertex of C.
Proof: It is immediate because p A is a convex combination of the vertices of C, {v i ji ¼ 1, . . ., t}.
A Proposition 1. Let C X and C Y be credal sets on finite sets X and Y, respectively, and let w be the mass assignment of 
We need the following implications:
for all A £ B # X £ Y, where f 0 denotes the capacity associated with m 0 . The proof of the first implication is straightforward:
To prove the second implication, we need Lemma 1:
with v(K) being the set of vertices of K, but K ¼ CH(C X £ C Y ) and all the vertices are r i ·s j , with r i and s j being vertices of C X and C Y , respectively. That is,
where v(C X ) and v(C Y ) are the sets of vertices of C X and C Y , respectively. Now, the functions w and m 0 have equal values for all subsets of X £ Y. We need to prove that they coincide in the rectangles because we know that, by definition, in other sets these functions attain 0 value. We use the following reasoning: we suppose that this is not true, and define the following set: In these two expressions, all components corresponding to the rectangles are equal. Then, a set J 0 must exist that is not a rectangle, such that f(J 0 ) -f 0 (J 0 ), with J 0 , A 0 £ B 0 and then
. This implies that:
and that a setĴ , J 0 exists such that mðĴÞ -m 0 ðĴÞ. Hence, we know thatĴ is a rectangle (if it is now a rectangle, then 0 ¼ mðĴÞ ¼ m 0 ðĴÞ). Since jĴj , jA 0 £ B 0 j; we get a contradiction. A
We can check that the weak conditions of the Proposition 1 appear in the Example 2: all the focal sets of the mass assignment of the joint credal set are rectangles. These conditions do not appear in the Example 2. Therefore, the joint credal set obtained using strong independence and mass independence are equal in Example 3 and different in Example 2.
Additivity of uncertainty measures
In general terms, we can define the requirement of additivity for uncertainty measures on credal sets in the following way.
Definition 3 Additivity for Uncertainty Measures. Let P be the set of all the credal sets on a universal X £ Y, with X and Y finite sets. Then we can say that an uncertainty measure U:'(X £ Y) ! [0,r] with '(X £ Y) the power set of (X £ Y) satisfies the requirement of additivity iff under a given concept of independence, it is verified that
where C X and C Y denote the marginal credal sets of C on X and Y, respectively.
In this paper, we consider only the concepts of strong independence and mass independence. Under the mass independence, the definition of additivity is an extension of the one established in DST.
In this section, we want to study the verification of the additivity property of uncertainty measures, GH, S*, S * ; S* 2 S * on credal sets under these two concepts of independence.
In Moral (2003, 2005a) , it is proven that S* and S * are additive under strong independence and, hence, S* 2 S * is additive as well. In Abellán and Moral (2000) , it is proven that GH is additive under mass independence. Let us examine now the remaining cases. One of them is resolved by the following example, which demonstrates that GH is not additive under strong independence. where we denote p ij ¼ p(x i ,y j ) and a probability distribution on X £ Y as p(p 11 , p 12 , p 21 , p 22 ). For the sake of simplicity, we denote: However, using the equivalence relations between strong independence and mass independence conditions (Proposition 1), function GH is additive under strong independence.
Proposition 2. Let C X and C Y be credal sets of finite sets X and Y, respectively. Let w be the mass assignment of
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 1.
A Function S* is additive under both definitions of independence considered in this paper. To show it, we need the following Theorem 1 and Lemma 2.
Theorem 1 (Gibbs's inequality). The following inequality
is satisfied for all probability distributions q on a finite set X with jXj ¼ n. Let f be the lower probability associated with m. Considering a probability distribution p [ C m , we obtain: We only need to prove thatp X Áp Y [ C m , but this can be done in the same way as in Harmanec and Klir (1994) for S* in DST; we only need to replace function Bel with function f.
A
We can now show that function S * (and, hence, also function S* 2 S * ) is not additive under the mass independence. 
Conclusions
In this paper, the concept of strong independence and mass independence for credal sets are compared. It is proven that they are not equivalent, in general, but they become equivalent under the weak condition stated in Proposition 1. Mass independence is defined in this paper by extending the concept of mass independence from DST to general credal sets in a strictly logical way. Since the mass assignment function for credal sets that are not subsumed under DST contains negative values, this extension needs to be further investigated and justified. 
